An investigation of source memory in learning disabled children by Ewing, Roseanne Hatt
University of Nebraska at Omaha
DigitalCommons@UNO
Student Work
8-1992
An investigation of source memory in learning
disabled children
Roseanne Hatt Ewing
University of Nebraska at Omaha
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.unomaha.edu/studentwork
Part of the Special Education and Teaching Commons
This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by
DigitalCommons@UNO. It has been accepted for inclusion in Student
Work by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@UNO. For
more information, please contact unodigitalcommons@unomaha.edu.
Recommended Citation
Ewing, Roseanne Hatt, "An investigation of source memory in learning disabled children" (1992). Student Work. 286.
https://digitalcommons.unomaha.edu/studentwork/286
AN INVESTIGATION OF SOURCE MEMORY 
IN LEARNING DISABLED CHILDREN
A Thesis 
Presented to the 
Department of Special Education 
and Communication Disorders 
and the
Faculty of the Graduate College 
University of Nebraska
In Partial Fulfillment 
of the Requirements for the Degree 
Master of Science 
University of Nebraska at Omaha
by
Roseanne Hatt Ewing 
August 1992
UMI Number: EP72926
All rights reserved
INFORMATION TO ALL USERS 
The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted.
In the unlikely event that the author did not send a complete manuscript 
and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if material had to be removed,
a note will indicate the deletion.
Published by ProQuest LLC (2015). Copyright in the Dissertation held by the Author.
Dissertation Publ sh*ng
UMI EP72926
Microform Edition © ProQuest LLC.
All rights reserved. This work is protected against 
unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States Code
ProQuest LLC.
789 East Eisenhower Parkway 
P.O. Box 1346 
Ann Arbor, Ml 48106- 1346
THESIS ACCEPTANCE
Acceptance for the faculty of the Graduate College, 
University of Nebraska, in partial fulfillment of the 
requirements for the degree Master of Science, University of 
Nebraska at Omaha.
Committee
Name ^  Department
 ^    P^syc A /cyy
Chairman
7 /■> ?/ n
Date
ABSTRACT
Recognition memory and memory for source information 
were examined in learning disabled (LD) and nondisabled 
(NLD) children in two experimental conditions. In the 
listen-listen condition (external source monitoring), 
subjects watched a videotape in which two girls completed 
sentences that were constructed so as to highly constrain a 
terminal noun. In the think-listen condition (reality 
monitoring), subjects were asked to imagine themselves 
completing some sentences and to listen as a girl on the 
videotape completed other sentences. In each of the two 
experimental conditions, half of the stimuli were presented 
once, and half were presented twice. Recognition memory and 
source memory were tested for each of the terminal nouns.
This study observed that, while no differences were 
found between groups in regard to recognition memory, LD 
subjects were generally less able to discern the source of 
their memories than their NLD counterparts. These results 
confirm the hypothesis of Lorsbach et al. (1991) that, at 
least with verbal information, LD children possess a 
generalized deficit in remembering the source of their 
memories. The results also revealed that recognition and 
source memory were dissociated by the effects of population 
and acquisition condition. These dissociations support the
proposition that recognition and source memory are based on 
different mechanisms (Johnson & Raye, 1981).
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1CHAPTER ONE 
Introduction
The degree to which an individual is able to function 
in daily life depends, to a great extent, upon that 
individual’s capacity to remember past happenings in the 
environment as entities that are separate and distinct from 
his or her own past thoughts, ideas, and plans. For 
example, when an individual fails to remember a certain 
event (e.g., a melody, a written passage, or an idea) as 
having been perceptually presented by a source outside of 
himself or herself, it is then possible for that individual 
to recreate that event with the belief that he or she has 
produced an original work. Depending on the particular 
circumstances, such oversights may result in disrupted 
personal relationships, workplace disputes, or even, by way 
of extrapolation, major legal allegations, such as in 
copyright infringements.
Even when an individual succeeds in recognizing the 
origin of a memory as one that was presented outside of 
himself or herself by the environment, he or she may 
experience difficulty in attributing that memory to a 
specific source. For example, a waitress may not remember 
which of two customers at a table ordered a steak cooked 
rare and which one ordered a well-done steak. Or, a 
librarian may not remember which of two students asked to
2reserve a particular book. A complex variation of this type 
of discrimination forms the basis for eyewitness testimonies 
in courts of law. For instance, a person who has witnessed 
an incident may subsequently be exposed to an inaccurate 
account of that same incident. Thus, the potential exists 
for some persons to confuse information contained in the 
erroneous account with the original, personally-witnessed 
information (see Cohen & Faulkner, 1989; Loftus, 1979).
Thus, as with differentiation errors in memories for 
externally-perceived versus internally-generated events, 
errors in discriminating between the memories for several 
externally-perceived events may also carry consequences with 
serious implications.
Similarly, failure to discriminate between memories of 
internally-generated events has the potential to cause chaos 
in an individual's life. Many adults may ask themselves 
such questions as, "Did I unplug the coffeepot or did I only 
think about doing it?" or, "Have I already asked for 
t o m o r r o w  off or did I only plan on doing so?" When a m e m o r y  
is not clear, individuals may act according to decisions 
they make about certain characteristics of the memory. A 
person may reason that his/her memory of unplugging the 
coffeepot is so vague that it was probably only a thought 
that went unactualized. In contrast, an individual who is 
unsure of having talked with his or her boss may
3subsequently recall what the boss was wearing at the time of 
the conversation or the tone of his or her voice.
In each case, the actions being considered by the 
individuals are based on their conclusions about their 
memories and may be subject to further criteria in which the 
potential consequences of the actions are examined. For 
instance, the person who concluded that the coffeepot is 
still plugged in may or may not be worried enough about the 
possibility of a fire to return home to unplug the pot. 
Likewise, the individual with the work dilemma will need to 
evaluate whether it would be more damaging for him or her to 
erroneously decide that approval for the day off had already 
been obtained or to suffer the embarrassment of repeating 
something that had already been done.
A framework for memory discrimination (source 
monitoring) and related decision processes has been provided 
by the reality monitoring model of Johnson and Raye (1981). 
This model has been used to explain memory differences 
between a variety of populations, including manic and 
schizophrenic patients (Harvey, 1985); field dependent and 
field independent individuals (Durso, Reardon, & Jolly,
1985); and children and adults (e.g., Foley, Johnson, &
Raye, 1983; Johnson, Raye, Hasher, & Chromiak, 1979;
McIntyre & Craik, 1987). Additionally, the reality 
monitoring model has recently been applied to learning
4disabled populations (e.g., Lorsbach, Melendez, & Carroll- 
Maher, 1 991 ).
Statement of Purpose
The purpose of the present study is to investigate 
whether a deficit exists in the source monitoring abilities 
of learning disabled children in two areas of 
discrimination: (1) discrimination between memories of
self-generated, covertly expressed ideas and memories of 
external perceptions and (2) discrimination between memories 
of two external perceptions. Demonstration of these 
specific deficits, together with results of previous 
research, would provide strong evidence for the hypothesis 
that LD children possess a generalized deficit in 
remembering the source of memories containing verbal 
information (see Lorsbach et al., 1991).
Significance of the Problem
The proposed study has implications for a better 
understanding of specific memory difficulties of LD 
children. The consequences of the particular types of 
inaccurate source memory investigated in this study may 
affect the lives of LD children on a daily basis. For 
example, imagine that an LD child responds with the answer 
"13" to the problem 8 + 3 . This student may persist in that 
response, even after teacher correction, if he or she is 
unable to accurately identify the source of the response as
5one that he or she provided and not one that the teacher had 
provided. Likewise, the same situation exists if the 
student hears an incorrect response generated by a 
classmate: If the LD student is unable to identify the
source of the incorrect response as a classmate and not the 
teacher, he or she may persist in that error, even after 
teacher correction. Therefore, an impaired ability to trace 
information to appropriate sources may play a critical role 
in the learning difficulties of LD children. When the 
source is lost, LD students may perseverate their own 
miscues or miscues generated by classmates, even after 
teacher correction. The previous statements assume that 
appropriate decision processes and response biases are 
intact in this population, when, in actuality, these 
dimensions are also in need of further study.
6CHAPTER TWO 
Review of Related Research and Literature 
Johnson and Raye1s Reality Monitoring Model
Johnson and Raye (1981) coined the term "reality 
monitoring" to reflect their model's incorporation of 
components of the theories of reality testing and memory 
monitoring. Reality testing refers to the process of 
distinguishing current real events from present 
imaginations, whereas reality monitoring makes comparisons 
between memories of past perceptions and past imaginations. 
Also incorporated into the reality monitoring model is a 
concept from Hart's (1967) memory monitoring theory that 
judgments can be made about information in memory.
On a practical level, reality monitoring can be the 
process by which an individual is able to distinguish his or 
her own ideas, thoughts, and plans from those shared with 
him or her by others (e.g., "Is that my_ idea or have I seen 
it somewhere before?"). Sometimes, when the reality 
monitoring process goes awry, confusion is the result (e.g., 
"That's not your idea! I came up with it two weeks ago at 
our planning meeting.").
In their theoretical model, Johnson and Raye address 
possible reasons for confusion in reality monitoring. They 
contend that the accuracy of reality monitoring is 
influenced by two factors. First, reality monitoring
7depends upon the specific characteristics of the memory 
traces. Characteristics of memory traces are described as 
varying according to whether the memory resulted from an 
internally-generated idea or an externally-perceived event. 
According to Johnson and Raye (1981), memory traces 
resulting from perceptions have more spatial, contextual, 
and sensory attributes and more semantic detail. In 
contrast, internally generated memories "may typically have 
more [cognitive] operational attributes (coded in the 
trace)" (p. 71).
The second factor that affects the accuracy of reality 
monitoring is the decision strategies and biases which are 
derived from metamemory assumptions and applied to 
information in memory. The findings of Johnson and Raye 
(1981) indicate that ". . . subjects' assumptions about how
their memories work will play a critical role in decision 
strategies and biases operating during reality monitoring" 
(p. 80). One such metamemory assumption is manifested by 
"the generation effect," an expectation by subjects that 
memories of self-generated events will be more vivid than 
memories of events that have external derivations (Slamecka 
& Graf, 1978). This assumption is displayed in the 
operation of a bias which Johnson and Raye (1981) have 
called " 1it-had-to-be-you' ('I'd remember if it were me')"
(p. 80). Research with different populations has found
8biases that are manifested and operate under a variety of 
conditions. For example, Cohen and Faulkner (1989) observed 
that elderly subjects were biased to decide that false 
positives (i.e., new actions incorrectly remembered as old 
actions) were watched instead of imagined. Foley, Johnson, 
and Raye (1983) observed that 9-year-old children in a say- 
listen condition were biased to attribute false positives to 
an external source, rather than to themselves. However, 
6-year-olds did not demonstrate this bias. Instead, they 
were equally likely to attribute unfamiliar words to either 
source.
Review of Reality Monitoring Research
One of the key predictions of the reality monitoring 
model is that it should be easier to discriminate memories 
of different classes (e.g., telling a joke vs. hearing one) 
than to discriminate memories within the same class (e.g., 
thinking of telling a joke vs. actually telling one). A 
study by Raye and Johnson (1980) investigated the degree to 
which this may be true. In Experiment 1 , a sample of 
college students was divided into four small groups and 
assigned various roles. In each group, two students were 
designated as speakers, two as recorders, and two or three 
students as listeners. All subjects thought that the 
speakers and recorders were serving as experimenters and 
that the listeners were the subjects, who would be given a
9memory test after the research task had been completed.
Each small group was given a one-word topic (e.g., snow) as 
a point of departure for the "conversation" that was to 
follow. Individuals in each speaker pair were to alternate 
and produce a chain of words in which each response was 
highly related to the one which preceded it. Subjects were 
instructed to use common words and to respond quickly. For 
example, for the stimulus "snow," Speaker A might respond 
"white,"; Speaker B might counter A's response by saying 
"black," to which Speaker A might respond "coal," and so 
forth.
Recorder A was instructed to write down all of the 
words that Speaker A said, and Recorder B was to record all 
of Speaker B's words. The listeners were told to pay close 
attention since they would receive a memory test later. The 
task ended when each speaker had generated 15 words.
After attending a 1-hour lecture, all subjects 
(contrary to what they had been told) were paced through a 
memory test. Speakers were asked to identify the origin of 
words they remembered as either self-generated or having 
been produced by the other speaker; recorders and listeners 
were asked to attribute the source of words they remembered 
to one of the two speakers. The role of recorders resembled 
that of speakers in that recorders overtly produced half the 
words and performed a covert task (listening) in response to
1 0
the other words. However, unlike speakers, recorders did 
not generate the words they produced overtly.
Data collected during this experiment revealed similar 
outcomes in both recognition and source identification for 
listeners and recorders, the two groups who discriminated 
between two external sources. However, speakers, who 
discriminated between self-generated and externally- 
presented words, were better at identifying the origin of 
words than any of the other subjects. According to the 
reality monitoring model, subjects distinguishing between an 
internal and external memory (speakers) would be expected to 
be better at identifying the origin of words than subjects 
discriminating between two external sources (recorders and 
listeners). This hypothesis was confirmed by the 
experimental data.
Raye and Johnson (1980) contend that their findings 
support the proposed differences between the two classes of 
memories. When memories come from different classes, the 
discrepancies between them are more apparent than when 
memories originate within the same class. The 
distinctiveness of between-class memories may, in part, be 
due to the cognitive operations information contained in 
internally-generated ideas. This information is typical of 
memories for internally-generated ideas and is noticeably 
deficient in memories of externally-perceived events. Such
11
a discrepancy may be used as a cue in external-internal 
discriminations that is not available for discriminations 
involving memories of the same class.
Raye and Johnson (1980) further defined the 
characteristics of memory traces by examining memories for 
internally-generated and externally-presented events for 
differences in idiosyncratic value. It was proposed that 
memories of internally-generated ideas would contain a 
higher degree of "biographical information or information 
relevant to the 'self'" (p. 406). This proposition was 
investigated in a second experiment, where the words that 
were generated were highly constrained by cues, thereby 
eliminating as much as possible any idiosyncratic 
information that would otherwise be available.
Using all new subjects, Experiment 2 utilized the same 
role assignments as for the first experiment with the 
addition of a director. The director presented the items of 
the acquisition task to the speakers and indicated which 
speaker was to answer, the type of question (opposites or 
category instances), and the first and last letter of the 
answer. For example, the director might indicate that 
Speaker A was to answer the following question on opposites: 
"'What is a word that is the opposite of fast, beginning 
with s and ending with w ? " 1 (Raye & Johnson, 1 980, p. 406 ). 
The outcome of interest was whether subjects discriminating
12
between internal and external memories would continue to 
show superior origin identification even when idiosyncratic 
cues were eliminated.
As in Experiment 1, speakers in Experiment 2 were much 
better than listeners and recorders at identifying the 
origin of responses. This result rules out the possibility 
that the superior performance of speakers in Experiment 1 
can be entirely attributed to the idiosyncratic value of the 
response since responses in Experiment 2 were, for all 
practical purposes, devoid of such information. Although 
idiosyncratic cues would be a logical component of reasoning 
processes in reality monitoring, the results of this 
experiment "are consistent with the possibility that, 
independent of the personal significance of what an 
individual says, the cognitive operations that go into 
generating information persist in memory and become 
potential cues as to the origin of that information" (Raye & 
Johnson, 1980, p. 408).
Another interesting result was that directors were as 
good as other subjects at recognizing items as old, even 
though they were less able to identify the origin of these 
old items. According to Raye and Johnson (1980), this 
finding suggests that "simply attending to the items does 
not guarantee correct identification of origin. The 
dissociation of memory for occurrence and identification of
1 3
origin indicates they are not based on exactly the same 
information or mechanism" (p. 407).
The dissociation of memory for occurrence and 
identification of origin was further corroborated by Lindsay 
and Johnson.(1 991 ). The essential point of this study was 
"that the conditions that led to superior recognition 
performance were precisely those that led to inferior source 
monitoring performance" (p. 205). College-aged subjects
were assigned to two conditions, deep-deep and deep-shallow. 
Each subject was presented with cards from two sets, with 
words from one set being introduced on the left and words 
from the other set being introduced on the right. Subjects 
in the deep-shallow condition were asked to make up a 
sentence for each word presented on the left and to count 
the number of "E"s in words presented on the right.
Subjects in the deep-deep condition were asked to make up 
sentences for both sets of words, regardless of the site of 
presentation.
Half of the subjects in each condition were 
subsequently given a recognition test in which target words 
presented on the right were intermixed with new items. The 
remaining subjects were given a source monitoring test, 
consisting of 20 words presented on the right intermixed 
with 20 words presented on the left.
Experimental results indicated that subjects were 
better at discriminating the origin of words when they had 
processed the words on each side in different ways than when 
they had performed the same task for all the words. Lindsay 
and Johnson (1991), therefore, concluded that " . . .  it 
appears that subjects can use information about the kinds of 
cognitive operations associated with potential sources to 
identify the source of memories" (pp. 204-205). In regard 
to recognition of target items, words that were processed 
deeply were better recognized as old than words that had 
only been processed at a shallow level. Lindsay and Johnson 
(1991) contend that their findings "demonstrate that the 
aspects of memories that support recognition judgments are 
not necessarily the same as those that support source 
monitoring judgments . . ." (p. 205). Thus, the results of 
this experiment corroborate the findings of Raye and Johnson 
(1980).
A 1979 study by Johnson, Raye, Hasher, and Chromiak 
investigated the question of whether repeated imaginations 
could alter the memory trace of an internal generation to 
such an extent as to make it resemble the m e m o r y  of a 
similar externally-perceived event. In the following 
experiment, the researchers expected that, if repeated 
imaginings were being confused with external presentations,
1 5
subjects would give inflated estimates of the number of 
times external presentations had occurred.
Subjects at each of four grade levels (second, fourth, 
sixth, and college) were individually tested. Pictures of 
common objects that children would recognize were 
photographed, made into color slides, and assigned to each 
of nine conditions that were produced from the combination 
of three presentation frequencies (1, 2, and 3 times) and
three imagination frequencies (0, 1, and 3 times). During
the study phase of the experiment, subjects were presented 
with alternating blocks of eight slide presentations and 
eight imagination trials. In a subsequent recognition test, 
subjects were shown each picture and asked to make a 
judgment about how many times the picture had been 
presented.
In this experiment, Johnson et al. (1979) expected that 
"children would be more likely to confuse their thoughts 
with external events and, thus, show more confusion about 
how often they had seen things" (review by Johnson and 
Foley, 1984, p. 41). Experimental data revealed several 
interesting patterns in reference to this expectation.
First of all, judgments of all subjects across all age 
levels appeared to be appropriately affected by the number 
of times a slide was presented (i.e., judging the more 
frequently presented slides as having been presented more
1 6
frequently). Secondly, the effects of imagination frequency 
on judgments of presentation frequency were analyzed. All 
subjects gave inflated estimates of actual presentation 
frequency for slides that were imagined more frequently.
This was a surprising outcome in that, contrary to what was 
anticipated, children displayed no greater confusion than 
adult subjects (Johnson & Foley, 1984).
Johnson, Raye, and Durso (1980) explored a related 
condition by examining whether repeating subject-generated 
information would have the effect of increasing the sensory 
attributes of the corresponding memory traces to such a 
level as to make them resemble memories for external events. 
Subjects were presented with an audiotape of sentences 
lacking a terminal noun. The sentences were composed so 
that the last word was highly constrained by the context
(e.g., "A chair is a piece of __________ ."). Sentences were
randomly selected and assigned to each of four conditions: 
generation by the subject one time, generation by the 
subject two times, presentation by the experimenter one 
time, and presentation by the experimenter two times.
Only sentences that produced complete agreement among 
pilot subjects were included in the study in an effort to 
control to the greatest degree possible the responses 
subjects would generate. For half of the sentences, 
subjects listened as an experimenter supplied the answer,
1 7
and for the other half, subjects covertly generated the 
response. Shortly after the end of the acquisition phase, 
subjects were given a recognition test in which they 
indicated whether items on a list had been self-generated or 
experimenter-presented or were completely new.
The premise underlying this experimental procedure was 
that repeating subject-generated words would increase the 
amount of their sensory attributes, thus altering them to 
resemble experimenter-presented words and leading to 
confusion. However, the data did not bear this out. 
Repetitions actually reduced the tendency of subjects to 
wrongly identify self-generated words as experimenter- 
presented items. Johnson et al. (1980) hypothesized that 
instead of altering memories for self-generated ideas, 
repetitions reinforced those characteristics of the trace 
that made them identifiable as internally generated. 
Repetitions, therefore, increased the chances that the 
subject had the necessary information to identify the trace 
as internally generated. Results of this study revealed 
that, for externally-presented items and internally- 
generated items alike, repeating an item increased correct 
origin decisions. Johnson et al. (1980) concluded that 
Since there was virtually no opportunity for 
idiosyncratically meaningful responses in these highly 
constrained contexts, the most reasonable explanation
1 8
for the results is that origin decisions were based in 
part on information about cognitive operations, and 
repeating an operation increased its availability.
(p. 403)
Subjects in this experiment also showed a bias toward 
identifying unfamiliar items more often as externally 
presented than internally generated. This phenomenon has 
been called by Johnson and Raye (1981) "'it-had-to-be-you' 
('I'd r e m e m b e r  if it were me')" (p. 80).
These results seem to contradict the findings of 
Johnson et al. (1979), in which repeated imaginations of 
externally-presented stimuli resulted in confusion over the 
actual number of presentations of the stimuli. It must 
first be noted that the Johnson et al. (1979) study analyzed 
frequency confusion, whereas Johnson et al. (1980) 
investigated source confusion. Additionally, the two 
studies utilized fundamentally different experimental tasks. 
The experimental task of Johnson et al. (1979) required 
subjects to repeatedly imagine events that were originally 
externally-presented, a far different task than repeatedly 
imagining events that were initially self-generated, as in 
Johnson et al. (1980). Therefore, a logical explanation for 
the seeming contradiction between the findings of the two 
studies is that thinking of events that were previously
1 9
perceived may be different than thinking of events that were 
initially self-generated.
Johnson, Raye, Foley, and Foley (1981) later used the 
technique of response constrainment to investigate whether 
the amount of cognitive operations information included in a 
memory trace could be limited by the automaticity of a 
response. They theorized that the more strongly a response 
is indicated by a given stimulus, the more automatic that 
response is, and the less that memory will include 
information about cognitive processes such as search and 
decision making. The results of this study were consistent 
with the theory proposed: As cognitive operations
increased, the accuracy of identifying the origin of the 
words increased.
The first of three experiments in this study involved 
three between-subjects factors: type of material (category
instances vs. opposites), type of expression (overt vs. 
covert), and type of cue (first letter vs. no letter). 
Externally-perceived versus self-generated response was a 
within-subjects factor. All subjects were undergraduate 
student volunteers.
In the first-letter condition for each type of 
material, subjects used a response sheet that included the 
first letter of both E (experimenter-presented) and S 
(subject-generated) items. Subjects in the overt condition
20
recorded their answers on the response sheet; subjects in 
the covert condition indicated with a checkmark or a zero 
whether or not they had generated a response. Subjects were 
instructed to give common responses that they thought most 
other people would give and were told that all responses 
were equally important. Subjects were not warned about a 
subsequent recognition test.
After the acquisition phase, response sheets were 
collected and subjects were asked to recall their responses 
in any order. A cued recall test was also given in which 
subjects were asked to write the responses that went with 
the presented stimuli and to indicate whether they had heard 
the response on the tape or had generated it themselves.
The first question investigated was whether increasing 
automaticity of a self-generated response would limit the 
amount of cognitive operations in the response to such an 
extent that the memory trace would resemble, and be mistaken 
for, an externally-presented item. The data revealed that, 
for self-generated responses in the category condition, 
first-letter cues resulted in fewer correct identifications 
of origin.
As predicted by the reality monitoring model, memories 
for self-generated ideas can be confused with memories of 
perceived events if the amount of cognitive operations 
information coded in the memory trace is limited. In the
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opposites condition, the same pattern was not observed. 
However, this seeming discrepancy has a reasonable 
explanation: Responses in the opposites category were
already constrained to a high degree by virtue of the 
condition and stimulus. Their production would, therefore, 
not require much in the the way of search and decision 
processes in the first place, even without the first-letter 
cues.
A second pattern of results emerged in a materials by 
origin interaction. In the opposites condition, E items 
were more easily identified than S items, whereas in the 
category condition, the reverse was true. This polar result 
could be attributed to the effect of the "it-had-to-be-you" 
bias operating in the opposites condition. Whenever 
subjects were unsure of a response, they were more likely to 
call it E and thus raise the identification score for E 
items. The bias was operative in the opposites condition 
and not in the category condition because generating 
opposites produced less cognitive information which, in 
turn, presented the subject with the opportunity to use 
decision-making processes where the bias would unwittingly 
be applied.
A third pattern of results revealed superior 
identification of origin for overt items as compared to 
covert items. This was a surprising finding because,
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according to Johnson et al. (1981),
It would seem that writing down both E and S items 
would reduce the discriminability between the two by 
increasing the overlap in similar information stored 
with each event, compared with simply listening to E 
items and silently generating S items, (p. 46)
One explanation for this phenomenon is that writing the 
item merely rehearses the initial generation, which would be 
characteristically different for E and S items. According 
to Johnson et al. (1981),
. . . as the subject writes down an E item, it is done 
with reference to the original external experience, and 
thus the memory of the external experience is being 
rehearsed (or the initial experience is extended). In 
contrast, as the subject writes down an S item, it is 
done with reference to the original internal event, and 
thus the internal event is being rehearsed, (p. 46)
Therefore, a subject's accuracy in origin identification was 
found to be influenced by type of production (overt vs. 
covert).
A fourth finding was related to the "generation 
effect." A phenomenon previously noted by Slamecka and Graf 
(1978), the generation effect refers to the finding that 
recognition of memories for self-generated information is 
superior to the recognition of memories for
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externally-perceived information. The generation effect was 
observed to be operative in covert and overt conditions 
alike, thereby substantiating the theory of Johnson et al. 
(1981) that
. . . the locus of the advantage [for self-generated 
information] is in the generation process itself and 
does not, for example, depend upon overt expression of 
the generated item and consequent sensory components 
(e.g., hearing one's own voice or seeing one's own 
handwriting), or on some combination of generation and 
sensory components, (p. 46)
In the second experiment of this study, Johnson et al. 
(1981) investigated the nature of the generation effect and 
the limits of the retention period. In the first phase of 
the experiment, subjects saw a stimulus and 1st-letter cue 
for both category and opposite items. For half the items, 
the response was given and for the other half, the response 
was to be subject-generated. For category items, half of 
the instances were the most common instance (e.g., fruit- 
apple) and half were less common instances (e.g., animal- 
pig). These stimuli with their 1st letter cues were given 
to the subject on a response sheet, where he or she was 
asked to write down the response given by the experimenter 
or to generate one. Subjects were again instructed to give 
common responses. Ten days later, subjects were paced
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through a recognition test in which they were asked to 
identify each response as experimenter-presented (E), 
subject-generated (S), or new (N). Subjects were also asked 
to indicate their confidence in the accuracy of each 
response.
The results of this experiment yielded that, even after 
10 days, S items were easier to identify than E items. This 
finding was corroborated by high confidence ratings obtained 
for these items. Further, when new items were mistakenly 
identified as old, the generation effect manifested itself 
in the "it-had-to-be-you" bias (calling items E instead of 
S) .
The third experiment of this series investigated the 
cotemporal generation of ideas to external event stimuli. 
This condition has direct relevance to real life in that an 
idea is often formulated in response to an external stimulus 
(e.g., as in conversations) from which one may later wish to 
distinguish it. In this experiment, subjects were asked to 
generate responses to E items according to three conditions: 
first letter (e.g., apple-airplane), meaningful relationship 
(e.g., apple-earth), and unrelated (e.g., apple-clown). 
Immediately after the acquisition phase, subjects were asked 
to recall as many of their responses as they could. One 
week later, subjects were paced through a surprise 
recognition test in which they were asked to indicate the
25
origin of each item as experimenter-presented, self­
generated, or new, and to describe how they were able to 
identify the sources of the items.
Johnson et al. (1981) noted that
Interestingly, subjects tended to mention sensory cues 
more often with respect to E items ("I differentiated 
words which you said by remembering your
pronunciation,11 "I could visualize your saying it," or 
"The words which the E stated were remembered in her 
voice"). Cognitive processing, additional information, 
and semantic content were mentioned more in conjunction 
with S items ("When I was very sure [about my words] I 
could remember I had a very specific reason for making 
the association. If the word [only] seemed familiar, I 
would say that it was the experimenter's word," "I made 
the decision by knowing what my train of thought was 
during the exercise," "Sometimes the words I chose went 
together with a certain scene, i.e., pond, cloud, tree, 
etc. And, when I saw the words again I tried to 
remember if they fit in any of the images I had").
(p. 58)
Overall results of the Johnson et al. (1981) study 
yielded that in the first-letter condition and unrelated 
condition, subjects had superior memory for S items over E 
items, both in immediate recall and after a 1-week retention
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period. In contrast, poor reality monitoring was observed 
when S and E items were highly related semantically. The 
"it-had-to-be-you" bias was also apparent: "When a
completely new item was thought to be old, the subjects in 
all three conditions were about three times more likely to 
attribute it to an external source than to say they 
generated it themselves" (Johnson et al., 1981, p. 59). 
Conclusions of Reality Monitoring Research
Reality monitoring research with normal young adult 
subjects has reported a number of useful findings by which 
the theoretical model is assumed to operate. The following 
list summarizes the primary observations of the reality 
monitoring model:
1. Characteristics of memory traces. Characteristics of 
memory traces vary according to whether the memory trace 
originated from an internally-generated idea or an 
externally-perceived event (Raye & Johnson, 1980).
2. Characteristics of memories by class. Memory traces 
resulting from perceptions have more spatial, contextual, 
and sensory attributes and more semantic detail whereas 
internally-generated memories have more information about 
cognitive operations coded in the trace (Johnson et al., 
1980; Johnson et al., 1981; Lindsay & Johnson, 1991; Raye & 
Johnson, 1 980).
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3. Between-class versus within-class distinctions. It is 
easier to discriminate between memories of different classes 
than to discriminate between memories within the same class 
(Raye & Johnson, 1980).
In addition to describing the general dimensions of the 
reality monitoring model, the available literature seems to 
suggest a number of variables that may affect reality 
monitoring performance. These are enumerated in the list 
that follows:
1. Dissociation of occurrence and identification. Memories 
for occurrence and identification of origin are not based on 
exactly the same information or mechanism (Lindsay &
Johnson, 1991; Raye & Johnson, 1980).
2. "It-had-to-be-you (1 1d-remember-if-it-were-me)." The 
superior memorability of self-generated information in 
recognition and recall is called the generation effect 
(Slamecka & Graf, 1978). Manifestation of the generation 
effect is observed in the presence of the "it-had-to-be-you" 
bias during source decisions. Aptly described by the phrase 
"it-had-to-be-you (I 1d-remember-if-it-were-me), the bias is 
demonstrated by an increased likelihood that subjects will 
identify the origin of unfamiliar items as externally 
presented rather than self-generated (Johnson et al., 1980; 
Johnson et al., 1981; Raye & Johnson, 1980).
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3. Automaticity. Information about cognitive operations 
can be limited by the automaticity of initial processing 
(Johnson et al., 1980; Johnson et al., 1981; Lindsay & 
Johnson, 1991).
4. Idiosyncratic value. Idiosyncratic value, although a 
logical component of internally-generated memories, is not a 
major cue in origin discrimination (Raye & Johnson, 1980).
5. Frequency. Repeatedly thinking about events that have 
been perceived may result in inflated estimates of the 
number of times the event was actually perceived or actually 
happened. This tendency is not subject to developmental 
differences (Johnson et a l ., 1979).
6. Repetition. Repeated imaginations of pictorial 
generations, as well as repeated verbal generations, do not 
increase sensory information in the trace that would make 
the trace resemble an external memory. In contrast, both 
types of repetition reinforce the characteristics of the 
original trace, making that information more available for 
discriminations and resulting in increased accuracy of 
origin identification (Johnson et a l ., 1979; Johnson et al.,
1 980) .
7. Mode of expression. Rather than obscuring the 
differences between internally-generated and externally- 
perceived events, overt expression of both types of events 
increases the accuracy of origin identification. The
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beneficial effect of overt expression upon source monitoring 
presumably is due to the rehearsal of the memory of the 
original experience. In this case, rehearsal serves to 
strengthen those features that enable the individual to 
subsequently discriminate between the two kinds of events 
(Johnson et al., 1981; Raye & Johnson, 1980).
8. Semantic relationship of stimulus and response. If 
external stimuli and internal generations are highly related 
semantically, reality monitoring will be compromised 
(Johnson et al., 1981; Raye & Johnson, 1980).
Developmental Differences in Source Monitoring
The effect of aging on source monitoring. Source 
amnesia and source forgetting are distinctive memory 
failures distinguishable by the following: Source amnesia
refers to the failure of a subject to recognize that a 
particular fact had been learned as part of an experiment 
(occurrence); source forgetting, on the other hand, refers 
to the case when a subject is able to remember that a fact 
came from the experiment but is unable to identify the 
source (origin) of the information (i.e., which of two 
experimenters presented it) (Schacter, Harbluk, & McLachan, 
1984). Research experiments do not necessarily generate 
both kinds of information simultaneously, unless they are 
designed to do so.
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Several studies have investigated the effects of normal 
aging on source amnesia and source forgetting in older 
adults (e.g., Cohen & Faulkner, 1989; Hashtroudi, Johnson, & 
Chrosniak, 1989; McIntyre & Craik, 1987; Rabinowitz, 1989). 
In comparing source monitoring abilities in younger and 
older adults, McIntyre and Craik (1987) concluded that "with 
real-life factual material that is familiar to older people, 
the older subjects showed superior knowledge, equivalent 
episodic recall, but poorer memory for the source of new 
facts" (p. 183).
Hashtroudi et al. (1989) concluded from experiments 
using verbally-presented word acquisition lists that older 
adults have a specific rather than a generalized source 
monitoring deficit. Older adults did not demonstrate 
difficulty in reality monitoring; i.e., discriminating 
memories for self-generated information from memories for 
externally-perceived information. However, Hashtroudi et 
a l . (1989) note that
. . . older adults showed marked deficits in
discriminating between two memories of the same class 
(external and internal source monitoring). It should 
be emphasized, however, that age deficits in source 
monitoring would not necessarily be limited to within- 
class discriminations. As noted earlier, if the 
external and the internal sources are very similar on a
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number of dimensions, then there might be an age 
difference in reality monitoring as well. (p. 110)
Rabinowitz (1989) obtained results consistent with the 
above findings in two experiments with younger and older 
adults using word fragments. He proposed that "the locus of 
the age-related deficit in discrimination may be the 
decision process" (p. 266). Rabinowitz based this 
proposition on particular observations within Johnson and 
R aye's reality monitoring model (1981). Specifically, these 
observations were that cognitive operations would be the 
primary cue for discriminating between general classes of 
memories and that semantic, sensory, and contextual 
information would be less effective. Rabinowitz theorized 
that less accurate reality monitoring could be expected from 
older adults if they relied on the less effective types of 
cues more than younger adults. He accepted the observed 
operation of the "it-had-to-be-you" bias in younger adults 
and not in older adults as evidence that his theory was 
correct. Rabinowitz maintained that, lacking any memory of 
cognitive operations, younger adults made the decision that 
the origin of a memory is external by default. However, as 
mentioned previously, older adults did not demonstrate this 
bias; instead, a neutral bias or a bias toward self- 
generation was in evidence. Therefore, if older adults 
based origin decisions on different information than younger
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adults, the absence of cognitive operations information 
would not induce them to conclude that the memory was of an 
external event.
Cohen and Faulkner (1989) extended the effect of normal 
aging on source forgetting to action materials. Three 
groups of subjects were compared: a young group (M age =
31), a young-old group (M age = 65), and an old-old group (M 
age = 76). Subjects responded to cards indicating an action 
involving common objects arranged on a grid and one of three 
commands (perform, watch, or imagine). In perform trials, 
subjects performed the action; in watch trials, subjects 
watched as the experimenter performed the action; and in 
imagine trials, subjects were to look at the objects 
mentioned and imagine performing the action. Subjects 
expected a memory test of the actions that had occurred 
during the experiment but did not expect that the source of 
the actions would be tested. Nonetheless, in the subsequent 
recognition test, subjects were asked to identify the source 
of each experimental action as performed, watched, imagined, 
or new.
With regard to source amnesia, Cohen and Faulkner's 
(1989) results showed "no age decrement in ability to 
recognize old actions . . ." (p. 13). However, evidence of
source forgetting was apparent. Compared to younger groups, 
the old-old group was more likely to identify imagined items
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as ones they watched and watched actions as ones they 
performed, although accuracy was better for watched and 
performed actions compared to imagined ones. As noted by 
Cohen and Faulkner (1989), "This pattern of errors reflects 
both failures to distinguish between internal and external 
sources and failure to distinguish between self- and other­
generated actions" (p. 13).
Child development and source monitoring. The reality 
monitoring paradigm was applied to source monitoring in 
children in a multiexperiment study by Foley et al. (1983). 
In the first experiment, 6-year-olds, 9-year-olds, and 17- 
year-olds were compared across two conditions, say-think and 
say-listen. In the say-think condition, subjects were 
directly asked to pronounce some words aloud and to imagine 
themselves saying other words aloud. Subjects in the say- 
listen condition were asked to either pronounce words aloud 
or to listen to words being pronounced by a second 
experimenter. Words chosen for the study were common nouns 
from children's storybooks.
After the completion of the acquisition phase, a memory 
test was given. The experimenter read each word aloud and 
asked subjects in the say-listen condition whether the item 
was a word they had said, a word they had listened to, or a 
completely new word. Subjects in the say-think condition
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were asked whether each word was one they had said, one they 
had thought, or completely new.
Experimental results revealed that 9-year-olds 
performed as well in the say-think condition as in the say- 
listen condition. However, 6-year-olds gave unequal 
performances across those two conditions, as did 17-year- 
olds. Although 6-year-olds were as good as 17-year-olds in 
discriminating the origin of memories between classes (say- 
listen), this youngest age group demonstrated much greater 
difficulty in discriminating words they said from those they 
thought (an overt vs. covert within-class distinction). 
Results in the say-listen condition are consistent with 
earlier research (Johnson et al., 1979), suggesting that the 
ability to discriminate the origin of memories of different 
classes is well-developed by second grade. It additionally 
suggests the possibility that between-class discrimination 
abilities may be in place at a somewhat earlier age.
A second experiment was conducted to investigate 
whether the apparent difficulty of 6-year-olds in the say- 
think condition in the first experiment would be observable 
in a covertly expressed between-class discrimination task 
and in a within-class discrimination task of externally- 
perceived stimuli.
The basic procedures and materials were the same as for 
the first experiment, except that 17-year-olds were not used
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in the sample. In a new condition, the listen-listen 
condition, children were instructed to listen while the 
experimenter asked two adults to pronounce words out loud.
In another new condition, think-listen, subjects were 
instructed to imagine themselves saying some words and to 
listen while another person said other words. Children in 
the say-think and say-listen conditions were given the same 
instructions for the acquisition phase and recognition test 
as in the previous experiment.
Results of the first experiment were replicated in that 
6-year-olds had a difficult time discriminating in the say- 
think but not in the say-listen condition. In addition, 
results obtained with 9-year-olds across experiments did not 
support the prediction that the say-think condition would be 
more difficult than the say-listen condition (Foley et al., 
1983).
If 6-year-olds have difficulty in the say-think 
condition because younger children have trouble with within- 
class discriminations, then it would also be expected that 
this age group would experience difficulty in the listen- 
listen condition. In contrast with this expectation, 
results of the second experiment indicated that 6-year-olds 
performed as well as 9-year-olds in the listen-listen 
condition. Further, the 6-year-olds performed as well in 
the think-listen condition of this experiment as they did in
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the say-listen condition. Thus, 6-year-olds did not 
demonstrate difficulty in discriminating memories of their 
thoughts from their memories of external perceptions. 
Additionally, identification of origin was good even when 
the generation was covert.
The Johnson-Raye model would predict a difference 
between the say-listen and listen-listen conditions because 
within-class distinctions should be more difficult to make 
than between-class distinctions. As expected, subjects 
earned higher scores in the say-listen condition, the 
condition calling for a between-class discrimination.
According to the model, the greater difficulty of the 
listen-listen condition is because subjects have to 
rely on specific memory attributes of their experiences 
such as the speaker's voices or contextual attributes 
such as where the speakers were seated in the room to 
help them differentiate among their memories for who 
said what. In contrast, in the say-listen condition, 
subjects can take advantage of the several general 
dimensions on which the classes of internally and 
externally derived memories differ, such as, self­
generated memories usually are richer in information 
about cognitive operations that occurred when the 
memory traces were established. (Foley et al., 1983,
P. 56)
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Another possibility to consider would be that 6-year- 
olds are unable to discriminate memories of their thoughts 
from any other category. However, results of the think- 
listen condition rule out this explanation. Six-year-olds 
were at no disadvantage compared with 9-year-olds in 
discriminating between words they thought and words they 
heard. This outcome suggests that some distinctions may 
emerge sooner than others (e.g., the distinction of self vs. 
others may emerge sooner than the distinction of one's 
thoughts vs. one's actions).
According to Johnson and Foley (1984), the ability of 
6-year-old subjects to discern memories in the think-listen 
condition but not in the say-think condition
. . . is important for several reasons. It shows that
the disruption in children's performance in the say- 
think condition is not based on a general deficit in 
making decisions involving memories for imagined 
events. It also suggests that young children can 
understand instructions to identify imagined items. 
Finally, the results for the think-listen condition 
argue against Piaget's proposition that children have 
no idea about the origin of their own thoughts . . .
The 6-year-olds' deficit . . . was specific to
distinguishing their own thoughts about an action from 
their own actual actions--at least in the case of
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thinking about speaking versus actually speaking 
(P. 43).
Further research investigated whether this deficit 
would generalize to different types of activities. Foley 
and Johnson (1985) paralleled the say-listen, listen-listen, 
and say-think conditions with the activity-related 
conditions of do-watch, watch-watch, and do-pretend. Six- 
year-olds, 9-year-olds, and college-aged students were 
randomly assigned to one of the three conditions and 
responded to the appropriate "do," "watch," or "pretend" 
commands for a range of activities. After the experimental 
task was completed, subjects were given a test of free 
recall, as well as a recognition test. In the recognition 
test, subjects were read a list of actions by the 
experimenter and asked to identify them as old or new. 
Whenever subjects identified an action as old, they were 
then asked to identify the origin of that action.
Analysis of the results indicated that children did not 
differ from adults in their ability to discriminate their 
own actions from the actions of others (do-watch); or in 
their ability to discriminate between the actions of two 
other people (watch-watch). These results were similar to 
those obtained with verbal materials in the say-listen and 
listen-listen conditions of Foley et al. (1983). However, a 
difference was noted between the say-think condition of
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Foley et al. (1983) and its action parallel, the do-pretend 
condition of Foley and Johnson (1985). In the say-think 
condition of Foley et al. (1983), 9-year-olds were better 
than 6-year-olds in discriminating what they said from what 
they thought. In contrast, Foley and Johnson (1985) found 
that both 6-year-olds and 9-year-olds had difficulty in 
discriminating what they had done from what they had 
imagined doing*
In summary, findings obtained by Foley and Johnson 
(1985) regarding activity-related source monitoring 
paralleled findings obtained by Foley et al. (1983) with 
verbal materials. Additionally, the internal source 
monitoring difficulties demonstrated by 6-year-olds with 
verbal materials in the Foley et al. (1983) study were 
extended to 9-year-olds in the Foley and Johnson (1985) 
study when action materials were used. Thus, the findings 
of Foley et a l . (1983) were found to be highly generalizable
to a wide range of activities.
Further, results obtained by Foley and Johnson (1985; 
Experiment 1) with adult subjects were consistent with 
results obtained by Anderson (1984; Experiment 1) as part of 
a series of source monitoring experiments in which action 
materials were utilized with college students. In the first 
of five experiments of this study, subjects were asked to 
trace, imagine tracing, or look at line drawings and words.
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Results revealed that the origins of tracing and looking at 
items were more consistently identified than those of 
imagining. One explanation for this result is
the memory code of imagining may contain some 
attributes that can be interpreted as evidence for 
tracing and some that can be interpreted as evidence 
for looking. In this case, imagining may be less 
identifiable in memory than either tracing or looking, 
whose memory codes contain attributes that are 
consistent with only one other activity. (Anderson, 
1984, p. 599)
Brief summary and synthesis. A brief synthesis of 
research reviewed thus far would describe superior source 
monitoring in normal young adults relative to between-class 
discriminations, where the presence or absence of cognitive 
operations information is a major determinant in the 
judgment of whether a memory was internally generated or 
externally perceived. Of the possible within-class 
discriminations, young adults had the most difficulty 
differentiating the origins of words they said from words 
they thought. Source monitoring patterns with verbal 
materials were found to be generalizable to action 
materials, with young adults finding it most difficult to 
discriminate what they did from what they imagined doing. 
The superiority of memories for self-generated information
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(the generation effect) was found to manifest itself in a 
bias which caused young adults to judge the origin of 
memories of which they were uncertain as having been 
externally presented.
When compared with younger adults, older adults were 
found to demonstrate specific deficits in within-class 
discriminations, but not in the reality monitoring of verbal 
materials. With action materials, both within-class and 
reality monitoring deficits were observed with older adults. 
Additionally, there is some evidence "that naturally 
occurring errors in reality monitoring increase after the 
age of 70" (Cohen & Faulkner, p. 14).
The generation effect was observed in this population 
also, but when the origin of memories was unclear, older 
adults demonstrated a different type of bias in their 
decision making. While younger adults may judge a memory 
that lacks cognitive operations information as externally 
perceived, older adults demonstrate a neutral or opposite 
bias. Such biases may be the result of the combined use of 
cognitive operations information with less effective types 
of information (e.g., sensory) in the decision process.
Using young populations in order to obtain a 
developmental perspective, Foley et al. (1983) found that, 
when compared to older children, only 6-year-olds had 
specific deficits with verbal materials in discriminating
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words they said from those they imagined themselves saying 
(say-think condition). When action materials were used, 
both 6-year-olds and 9-year-olds had difficulty in 
discriminating imagined versus performed actions (do-pretend 
condition). The generation effect and apparent operation of 
normal biases were also observed with children as young as 
6 years old.
Individual Differences in Source Monitoring
Source monitoring research with psychotics. While 
deficits in source monitoring have been associated with some 
types of memory disorders (e.g., Alzheimer's disease and 
amnesic patients [see Cohen & Faulkner, 1989]), an 
interesting pattern of source monitoring deficits has also 
been found with various thought disorders.
Results obtained by Harvey (1985) indicated that non 
thought-disordered (N T D ) schizophrenic and manic patients 
had no difficulties in source monitoring with word list 
materials. However, both groups of thought-disordered (TD) 
patients demonstrated varying source monitoring deficits. 
Thought-disordered schizophrenics experienced difficulty in 
discriminating within-class self-generated memories, 
particularly in the case of distinguishing memories for 
thoughts from memories for words they said (say-think 
condition); they simultaneously performed as competently as 
normal subjects in discriminating information from two
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external sources (listen-listen condition). In contrast, TD 
manics demonstrated a specific deficiency in discriminating 
external within-class memories.
The primary finding of this study was the discovery of 
a difference in the response biases of NTD and TD 
individuals. Both normal adult subjects and NTD patients 
demonstrated a response bias in the think-listen condition 
toward misidentifying the source of list items and new items 
mistaken for old as words they thought rather than said. 
However, TD patients did not demonstrate this bias.
Instead, TD patients erred in the direction of believing to 
have said information they had only thought.
Harvey (1985) emphasizes the importance of the response 
bias by alluding to the developmental research of Foley et 
al. (1983), in which a deficit in the say-think condition 
was demonstrated by 6-year-olds. Harvey (1985) argues that 
the difference between normal 6-year-old children and TD 
schizophrenics, both of whom demonstrate difficulty in 
discriminating the memories of their thoughts from memories 
of what they said, is that 6-year-olds
tend to err in the direction of incorrectly reporting 
that they thought information, while TD patients err in 
the opposite direction . . . [The errors of 6-year-old
children,] like those of normal adults, reflect a bias
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that would not lead to the erroneous assumption that 
never-presented information has been said" (p. 72). 
Source monitoring research with learning disabled 
children. Lorsbach et al. (1991) examined source memory in 
LD and NLD children enrolled in grades 2 and 6. A series of 
sentences was constructed that highly constrained terminal
nouns (e.g., "Kermit is the name of a _________ . 11) .
An equal number of LD and NLD subjects at each grade 
level were randomly assigned to one of two conditions, say- 
think and say-listen. In the say-think condition, subjects 
were presented with incomplete sentences that were missing 
the terminal noun and were cued by an experimenter to 
complete each sentence by saying the word aloud or by 
thinking of themselves saying the word aloud. In the say- 
listen condition, subjects were cued to complete each 
sentence by saying the word aloud or by listening as the 
person on the tape completed the sentence.
In the subsequent recognition task, the experimenter 
read a list of words consisting of the nouns used in the 
acquisition task plus new words that served as control 
items. Upon hearing a given noun, subjects were asked to 
decide whether the word had been used to complete one of the 
previous sentences. In addition, if subjects indicated that 
a particular noun had been used to complete a sentence, they 
were then asked to decide whether they had said the word
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aloud or imagined saying it (for the say-think condition) or 
whether they had said the word aloud or listened to it on 
audiotape (for the say-listen condition).
Results of this study indicated that the recognition 
performance of NLD subjects was significantly higher than LD 
subjects. In addition, within their respective populations, 
sixth-grade subjects demonstrated better recognition than 
second-grade subjects. Within-class discrimination (say- 
think) was more difficult than reality monitoring (say- 
listen) for all groups. These results also indicate that, 
with the exception of the youngest LD children, subjects 
benefited by overtly saying words as compared with covertly 
thinking them. The discovery of an advantage for overt
t
expression over covert is consistent with results obtained 
by Raye and Johnson (1980), who had made a similar 
observation relative to college-aged populations.
The results of previous research suggest that LD 
children possess a generalized deficit in the source 
monitoring of verbal information. The present study seeks 
to examine the generalizability of the memory deficit by 
examining two other conditions: Listen-listen (a within-
class discrimination between two external sources) and 
think-listen (a between-class discrimination with covert 
generation). Deficits demonstrated in these two conditions, 
together with previous research, would strongly suggest a
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generalized deficit in the source monitoring of LD children, 
at least in memory for verbal information.
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CHAPTER THREE 
Methodology
Subj ects
Thirty-eight learning disabled (LD) sixth-graders and 
3 6 nondisabled (NLD) sixth-graders were selected randomly 
from two predominantly white, suburban school districts in 
Omaha, Nebraska. Twenty-eight boys and 10 girls comprised 
the LD group, and 24 boys and 12 girls were in the NLD 
group. The mean chronological ages for LD and NLD subjects 
were 12.13 (SD = .51) and 11.98 (SD = .41), respectively.
LD children were previously identified by school 
district personnel as learning disabled and as receiving 
services at the time of testing. Verification of a learning 
disability by school district personnel was based primarily 
upon two criteria. First, the child's full scale IQ was 
above the -1 standard deviation level on an individually 
administered intelligence test. For those children who had 
a discrepancy between composite scores that was greater than 
1 standard deviation, the higher score was used as the index 
of ability. The mean Verbal, Performance, and Full Scale IQ 
scores for the LD group were 99.25 (SD = 12.42), 107.41 (SD
= 10.55), and 103.05 (SI) = 9.80), respectively. Secondly, 
the child's standard score in one or more academic areas was 
1.3 standard deviations or more below the child's ability 
level and fell at or below 90 standard score points. The
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mean standard scores in reading and math achievement in the 
Wide Range Achievement Test-Revised (Jastak & Wilkinson, 
1984) were 82.97 (SD = 13.58) and 79.48 (SD = 12.22), 
respectively.
The selection of NLD students excluded those students 
who were receiving remedial services, as well as those who 
were enrolled in programs for gifted and talented students. 
No standard test scores were available pertaining to the 
cognitive abilities of the NLD sixth-grade students.
Design
The design for this experiment was a 2 x 2 x 2 
factorial. Population (LD and NLD) and acquisition 
condition (think-listen and listen-listen) were the between- 
subjects variables, with stimulus repetition (once-presented 
and twice-presented) being the within-subjects variable.
The think-listen condition was represented by 19 LD and 18 
NLD subjects. The listen-listen condition was represented 
by 19 LD and 18 NLD subjects.
Materials
Materials for this experiment were adapted from those 
developed by Lorsbach et al., 1991. In that study, 32 
sentences were constructed so as to highly constrain a
terminal noun (e.g., "We wear shoes on our ________ ."; "Jack
and Jill went up the ________ . "; "I have two sisters and one
________ . 11) . The terminal nouns within these sentences were
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selected so as to possess high concreteness ratings in 
existing word norms (M = 6.3; SD = .36) (e.g., Gilhooly &
Logie, 1980; Paivio, Yuille, & Madigan, 1968; Toglia & 
Battig, 1978). Each terminal noun was used only once and 
was not used in any of the remaining sentences. Highly 
predictable sentences were utilized in order to exert 
maximum control over the nouns that subjects generated for 
think items in the think-listen condition. Half (16) of the 
32 sentences were designated randomly as being either Set 1 
or Set 2.
In the present study, two versions of the original 
presentation list were created for each of the two 
acquisition conditions. In the think-listen condition, 
Version A was developed by omitting the terminal nouns of 
the 16 sentences in Set 1 (think items) and presenting the 
16 sentences from Set 2 in their completed form (listen 
items). Conversely, Version B was created by presenting the 
16 sentences from Set 1 in their completed form and the 16 
sentences from Set 2 in their incomplete form. Sentences 
were ordered randomly, but with the restriction that no more 
than 3 sentences from either Set 1 or Set 2 be presented 
consecutively.
The development of Versions A and B in the listen- 
listen condition followed the same procedure. In Version A, 
sentences from Set 1 were completed by one girl (Annie), and
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sentences from Set 2 were completed by a second girl 
(Sarah). Conversely, Version B was developed by presenting 
sentences from Set 1 to the second girl (Sarah) for 
completion and sentences from Set 2 to the first girl 
(Annie) for completion.
Included within the design of this experiment was the 
factor of stimulus repetition. The variable of stimulus 
repetition was manipulated within subjects by presenting 
half (16) of the sentences in each study list once and the 
remaining half (16) twice. An entire list of 48 sentences 
was presented in a random manner, with the restriction that 
there be at least 6 intervening sentences between the 
repetition of a given sentence. In order to assure that 
each sentence was presented equally often across the 
conditions of the experiment, stimulus repetition was 
counterbalanced with acquisition condition.
Counterbalancing was accomplished by constructing 2 sublists 
for Version A (A1 and A 2 ) and 2 sublists for Version B (B1 
and B 2 ). The construction of 2 sublists from each version 
resulted in one-half of the items in Sublist 1 being 
presented one time and those same items in Sublist 2 being 
presented two times. Conversely, those items that were 
presented once in Sublist 2 were presented twice in 
Sublist 1. An attempt was made to assign subjects within 
each population to each list about equally often.
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In addition to the 48 critical sentences, 3 buffer 
sentences were included at the beginning and end of the 
presentation list to reduce the possibility of primacy and 
recency effects in the subsequent recognition task. Thus, a 
total of 54 sentences were presented to each subject. 
Sentences were read aloud by an adult female Caucasian and 
were recorded on videotape for presentation at 1 Os 
intervals.
The stimuli used on the item recognition test consisted 
of the 32 terminal nouns from the preceding sentence list 
and 32 unrelated nouns that served as control items. None 
of the new nouns had been used in the construction of the 
preceding sentences. Old and new nouns were presented 
randomly, but with the restriction that no more than three 
old or three new nouns appear consecutively. The mean 
concreteness ratings of old and new nouns were equivalent 
(6.3 [SJD = .36] and 6.2 [SID = .41], respectively).
Procedure
Children were tested individually and were initially 
presented with the sentence completion task. Subjects 
assigned to the listen-listen condition were informed that 
they would be viewing a videotape in which a teacher would 
be presenting to two girls a series of incomplete sentences 
that were missing the final word (e.g., "Kermit is the name 
of a _______."). Subjects were further told that each girl
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would be called upon to complete sentences and that the 
subject's job was to help the experimenter check the 
responses of each girl. For each sentence, subjects were 
instructed to indicate by a nod of the head whether they 
agreed or disagreed that the word provided by the girl was 
the one most people would use to complete that sentence.
The agree/disagree response was elicited as a cover task to 
ensure attention to the words generated by the two girls.
Children in the think-listen condition were also 
informed that they would be viewing a videotape in which a 
teacher would be presenting a series of incomplete sentences 
that were missing the final word. Subjects in this 
condition were asked to play a game in which they imagined 
themselves sitting in an empty chair that was placed on one 
side of the teacher in the videotape. Also present in the 
videotape was a girl, who was sitting on the other side of 
the teacher. Subjects were told that both they and the girl 
would be called upon to complete sentences with the word 
most people would use to complete that sentence. Prompts to 
either imagine saying the word or to listen to the girl on 
the videotape say the word were given by the teacher on the 
videotape in the form of a hand gesture just prior to the 
presentation of the sentence. The teacher cued the subject 
by directing her hand at the empty chair (think) or at the
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girl on the videotape (listen). Mention was not made of the 
subsequent recognition task in either condition.
Upon completing the general instructions, children in 
each condition were given 6 practice sentences to 
familiarize them with the task and its requirements. In the 
think-listen condition, the videotape was paused after the 
practice sentences to verify that the "think" instructions 
were being followed. Subjects were asked what they did when 
thinking of themselves saying a word that completed one of 
the practice sentences (e.g., broom). If subjects responded 
that they thought of a broom, the instructions were repeated 
to emphasize that they should actually think of themselves 
saying the word and not think of the object they were 
naming.
Following the completion of the 54 sentences, each 
subject was given a digit-symbol substitution task (Wechsler 
Adult Intelligence Scale). The purpose of this 3-min filler 
activity was to remove the most recently presented sentences 
from immediate memory.
The final experimental task measured the child's memory 
for the occurrence of terminal nouns in each sentence, as 
well as the child's source memory for those nouns. The 
experimenter read aloud the 64-item list containing the old 
and new nouns and recorded the subject's decisions. The 
presentation rate of these nouns was subject-paced. Upon
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hearing a given noun, subjects were asked to decide whether 
the word had been used to complete one of the previous 
sentences. In addition, if subjects indicated that a 
particular noun had been used to complete a sentence, they 
were asked to decide upon its source. Subjects in the 
think-listen condition were asked whether they had imagined 
themselves saying a word or had listened to the word on the 
videotape. Children in the listen-listen condition were 
presented with a photograph of each of the two girls who had 
completed the sentences on the videotape. For those words 
that were judged to be old, source attributions were made by 
instructing subjects to point to the picture of the girl who 
originally said the word.
Finally, to make certain that the anticipated words had 
been generated during "think" instructions, subjects in the 
think-listen condition were given a post-experimental 
manipulation check. Responses to the 16 "think" items were 
verified by reading the incomplete sentences aloud and 
requesting the child say the word that completed the 
sentence.
LD subjects were administered the Reading and 
Arithmetic subtests of the Wide Range Achievement Test at 
the end of the testing session.
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CHAPTER FOUR 
Results
Old-New Recognition
Overall recognition. Recognition tests were scored 
without regard for correct identification of source to 
determine the number of hits ("old" responses to old items), 
misses ("new" responses to old items), false alarms ("old" 
responses to new items), and correct rejections ("new" 
responses to new items). Hit rates (i.e., the proportion of 
old items that were correctly remembered as being old) and 
false alarm rates (i.e., the proportion of new items that 
were incorrectly remembered as being old) were used to 
compute discrimination index (d1) scores for each subject in 
each of the repetition stimulus conditions.
Discrimination index scores (d1) are a part of a 
recognition memory model known as signal detection theory 
(Green & Swets, 1966). In signal detection tasks, subjects 
are exposed to two types of trials: Ones in which signals
are present and ones in which they are not. Trials which do 
not contain signals are said to be presentations of "noise." 
When signals are provided in trials, they are presented in 
addition to the existing background of noise. Signal 
detection analysis compares the normal distributions of the 
two types of stimulus situations that a subject may
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encounter: One of these distributions represents noise and
the other represents signal plus noise. The distance 
between the means of these two distributions in standard 
deviation units is measured by the discrimination index 
(d1). The greater the value of d 1, the greater is the 
distance between the means of the distributions, and the 
better is the subject's ability to discriminate between 
targets and distractors. Likewise, a d' value of 0 
indicates complete overlap of the distributions and a total 
failure to distinguish targets from distractors. The d' 
value is accepted as a measure of pure discrimination 
sensitivity separate from the effects of biases subjects may 
have used in their decision-making (Klatzky, 1975).
Table I provides mean d' scores according to 
population, acquisition condition, and repetition stimulus. 
The d' scores resulting from the hit rate and false alarm 
rate for each subject were submitted to a 2 X 2 X 2 mixed 
design analysis of variance (ANOVA), with population (LD or 
NLD) and acquisition condition (think-listen or listen- 
listen) as the between-subjects variables, and repetition 
stimulus as the within-subjects variable. This analysis 
revealed a main effect of repetition F(1,70) = 55.112,
MSe = .138, p < .001. The discrimination performance of 
subjects in both populations was significantly more accurate 
for those items for which two presentations were provided (M
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Table I
Recognition Performance of LD and NLD Children According 
to Acquisition Condition
LD NLD
Once Twice Once Twice
Think-Listen
d' 1.82 ( .69) 2.26 ( .62) 2.06 ( .65) 2.45 ( .51 )
beta 4.92 (3.53) 4.85 (3.25) 6.43 (2.97) 5.81 (2.71)
In beta 1.41 ( .79) 1 .24 ( .98) 1 . 73 ( .54) 1 . 63 ( .55)
Listen-Listen
d 1 1.75 ( .67) 2.28 ( .71 ) 1 . 94 ( .57) 2. 38 ( .58)
beta 4.47 (2.88) 3.78 (3.08) 6.29 (2.85) 5.68 (3.29)
In beta 1.26 ( -74) .96 ( .93) 1 . 69 ( .62) 1 .49 ( .85)
Note: Standard deviations are in parentheses.
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= 2.34) as compared to those for which only one presentation 
was provided (M = 1.89). None of the remaining main effects 
or interactions were found to be significant. Noteworthy is 
that the d 1 scores of LD and NLD children did not differ 
significantly, F(1,70) = 1.867, MSe = .665, p = .172. In 
spite of the fact that the means of the two groups move in 
the same direction as those of Lorsbach et a l . (1991), they
did not attain statistical significance.
A second feature of recognition memory, response bias, 
was examined through an analysis of beta scores. Beta 
scores are mathematical representations of the criterion 
adopted by individual subjects in deciding whether signals 
were presented or not. The performance of subjects who have 
adopted a strategy of maximizing their hits but minimizing 
their false alarms can be assigned a beta value of 1.0.
Beta values less than 1 are indicative of a lax decision 
criterion in which an item requires little strength to be 
reported as old. Consequently, subjects who have adopted 
this liberal criterion will respond "old" very frequently to 
both old and new items. This type of bias results in a high 
hit rate accompanied by a high false alarm rate.
Conversely, beta values greater than 1 are indicative of a 
stringent decision criterion in which an item requires great 
strength to be reported as old. The performance of subjects 
adopting such a conservative decision rule is characterized
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by low hit rates, along with low false alarm rates. Such a 
pattern is attributable to the subject's reluctance to 
identify an item as a signal unless he or she is quite sure 
(Klatzky, 1975).
Table I provides mean beta scores according to 
population, acquisition condition, and repetition stimulus. 
Because beta scores have assymmetric distributions, these 
values were expressed as natural logarithms, which have 
normal distributions more amenable to statistical analyses. 
The means of these transformed data are also reported in 
Table I.
The transformed data were submitted to a 2 X 2 X 2 
mixed design ANOVA, with population (LD or NLD) and 
acquisition condition (think-listen or listen-listen) as the 
between-subjects variables, and repetition stimulus as the 
within-subjects variable. This analysis revealed a main 
effect of population, F(1,70) = 5.786, MSe = 1.103,
£  = .017, with NLD subjects (M = 1.635) adopting a decision 
criterion that was significantly more conservative than that 
of their LD counterparts (M = 1.217). There was also a 
significant effect of repetition, F(1,70) = 15.545,
MSe = .090, £  < .001. In this case, the response bias of 
subjects in both populations was significantly less 
conservative for those items for which two presentations 
were provided (M = 1.33) as compared to those for which one
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presentation was provided (M = 1.522). No other main 
effects or interactions were found to be significant.
It is difficult to explain why subjects would shift 
their response criterion for repeated items. Such a result 
cannot be readily explained by any known theoretical 
framework. Typically, there are experimental variables or 
events that somehow bias responses. However, a critical 
examination of the materials used in the present study did 
not reveal any such artifacts. Therefore, the shift in beta 
revealed in the present analysis remains without 
explanation. Noteworthy is that the reliability of the d 1 
analysis is not compromised in any way by this spurious 
result.
Recognition according to item type. Previous research 
has shown self-generated information to have a benefit in 
memory for adults (e.g., Johnson et al., 1981), NLD children 
(Foley et al., 1 983), and LD children (Lorsbach et al.,
1991). This dimension of recognition memory is known as the 
generation effect and has been previously described by 
Slamecka and Graf (1978). To investigate whether a 
generation effect was operative in the present data, d 1 
scores were examined. Table II provides mean d' scores by 
item type for each acquisition condition. These d 1 scores 
were analyzed separately in each acquisition condition using 
a 2 (population) X 2 (item type) X 2 (repetition stimulus)
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Table II
Recognition Performance (d1 Scores) of LD Children and NLD 
Children According to Item Type in Each Acquisition 
Condition
Think-Listen 
Think Items 
Listen Items 
Listen-Listen 
Annie Items 
Sarah Items
LD NLD
Once Twice Once Twice
1.82 (.72) 
1.80 (.75)
1 .85 (.73 ) 
1.68 (.80)
2.15 (.64) 
2.35 (.70)
2.25 (.75)
2.26 (.72)
2.06 (.64)
2.07 (.88)
1.93 (.65) 
1.95 (.60)
2.55 (.60) 
2.37 (.56)
2.40 (.70) 
2.34 (.56)
Note: Standard deviations are in parentheses.
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mixed design ANOVA. Analysis of the think-listen condition 
indicated that there was only a main effect of repetition 
stimulus, F (1 ,3 5) = 26.826, M Se = .238, p < .001, with 
twice-presented items being more memorable than once 
presented items. The population X item type X repetition 
stimulus interaction fell just short of the traditional 
level of significance, F(1,35) = 3.656, MSe = .102,
^  = .061, and is best viewed as a trend in the data. In 
this case, there was a tendency for NLD subjects to remember 
twice-presented think items better than LD subjects.
Noteworthy is the absence of a main effect of item type 
(i.e., think items more recognizable than listen items) and, 
consequently, the failure of a generation effect to be 
observed. The superiority of "think" items in this data 
would be strongly predicted by Slamecka and Graf (1978). 
Furthermore, a generation effect was observed by Lorsbach et 
al. (1991) in a say-listen condition utilizing identical 
materials. Consideration of this information leads to the 
speculation that failure of the present data to reveal a 
generation effect in the think-listen condition may be 
attributable to the inherent difficulty of assuring subject 
compliance in covert tasks. While a post-experimental error 
probe may serve to verify covertly-generated responses, it 
is based on the assumption that subjects accurately report 
the exact responses they generated during the task. This
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may not have been the case. It is also possible that 
subjects may not have generated responses in the precise 
manner directed.
Analysis of the listen-listen condition revealed only a 
main effect of repetition stimulus, F(1,35) = 31.596,
MSe = .245, jD < .001, with twice-presented items being more 
memorable than once-presented items. There was no effect of 
item type (F < 1). Because the students in the videotape 
were similar in physical appearance and attire, there was no 
reason to expect that one student's presentations would be 
more memorable than the other's.
Source Monitoring
Overall source. Each subject's ability to remember the 
origin of their memories was based only on old items that 
were remembered. The rationale underlying this approach is 
that a subject must first have remembered an item in order 
to be able to recall its source. Consequently, the 
resulting source monitoring data are free of any possible 
differences in recognition memory between groups.
Table III presents the mean source monitoring scores 
(d') according to population, acquisition condition, and 
repetition stimulus. The d' scores were computed separately 
for the two levels of repetition stimulus in each 
acquisition condition (think-listen and listen-listen). In 
the think-listen condition, a hit rate for each subject for
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Table III
Judgment of Origin Performance for LD and NLD Children in 
Each Acquisition Condition
LD NLD
Once Twice Once Twice
Think-Listen
d 1 1 .50 ( .71 ) 2,. 01 ( . 83 ) 1 . 84 (: .48) 2,. 36 ( . 39)
beta 1 .48 ( . 70) 1 ,. 37 ( .51 ) 1 .55 (: .71) 1 ,. 33 ( . 68)
In beta 29 ( .48) .25 ( .36) .33 (: .47) .1 7 ( .48)
Listen-Listen
d 1 1 .08 ( .87) 1 . 27 ( . 91 ) 1 . 22 (: .83) 1 ,. 67 ( .86)
beta 1 .08 ( .34) 1 . 1 7 ( .34) 1.03 ( .30) 1 . 1 2 ( . 39 )
In beta 03 ( .32) . 1 1 ( .31 ) 0 ( .26) .06 ( . 32)
Note: Standard deviations are in parentheses.
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each repetition stimulus was represented by a proportion of 
correct "think" judgments given for the total number of 
"think" items remembered. A false alarm rate for each 
subject for each repetition stimulus was represented by a 
proportion of incorrect "think" responses given for the 
total number of listen items remembered. Similarly, for the 
listen-listen condition, a hit rate for each subject for 
each repetition stimulus was represented by a proportion of 
correct "Annie" judgments given for the total number of 
"Annie" items remembered. A false alarm rate for each 
subject for each repetition stimulus was represented by a 
proportion of incorrect "Annie" responses given for the 
total number of Sarah items remembered. For each of the 
acquisition conditions, the decision as to which item type 
to use in the calculation of d' was totally arbitrary. For 
example, in the think-listen condition, "listen" items could 
just as easily have been used to determine the hit rate and 
false alarm rate of each subject.
The d 1 values were submitted to a 2 X 2 X 2 ANOVA with 
population (NLD or LD) and acquisition condition (think- 
listen or listen-listen) representing between-subjects 
factors, and repetition stimulus (once-presented or twice- 
presented) as the within-subjects factor. If fewer than two 
items were remembered for either item type in either 
acquisition condition (i.e., think or listen items in the
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think-listen condition or Annie or Sarah items in the 
listen-listen condition), the d' score for that subject was 
excluded in the analysis of source monitoring. Although it 
is possible to use this data, the decision was made to 
exclude it due to the concern that artificially high or low 
scores would add to the variance.
Analysis of the d' data revealed that NLD subjects 
demonstrated more accurate memory for source information 
than their LD counterparts, F/1 ,65) = 3.885, MSe = .834,
]D = .05. The mean d 1 scores for the NLD group and the LD 
group were 1.77 and 1.46, respectively. The main effect of 
acquisition condition revealed that both populations 
demonstrated more accurate source memory in the think-listen 
condition (M = 1.925) than the listen-listen condition (M =
1 .305), F (1 ,65) = 1 5.751 , MSe = .834, £  < .001. Finally, 
there was a main effect of repetition stimulus, F(1,65) = 
18.010, MSe = .332, £  < .001. In this case, the source 
monitoring performance of subjects in both acquisition 
conditions benefited by a second presentation of the 
stimulus.
Beta values were analyzed to determine if there were 
significant differences in response bias. As with the 
preceding analysis of recognition memory performance, the 
analysis was based on the natural logarithms of the 
individual beta scores. These scores were submitted to a
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2 X 2 X 2  ANOVA with population and acquisition condition 
representing the between-subjects factors, and repetition 
stimulus representing the within-subjects factor. This 
analysis revealed only a main effect of acquisition 
condition, F(1,65) = 8.935, MSe = .172, £  = .004, indicating 
that subjects in the think-listen condition were more 
conservative than subjects in the listen-listen condition, M 
= .26 and M = .05, respectively.
Source attributions according to item type. Previous 
research (Johnson et al., 1980; Rabinowitz, 1989) has found 
that repetition may improve source memory for subject­
generated information, yet have no effect upon source memory 
for externally-derived information. Therefore, a further 
analysis was conducted to determine whether repetition had a 
differential effect upon the origin judgments of self- 
generations (think items) and externally-derived information 
(listen items).
The number of correct source attributions for each item 
type were determined for each subject. Utilizing a method 
that has been employed by previous investigators (e.g., 
Johnson et al., 1981), the proportion of correct source 
decisions for each item type was computed for each subject. 
These source proportion scores were calculated by dividing 
the number of correct source attribution responses by the 
total number of remembered items. A score of 1.0 represents
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perfect source monitoring (e.g., the subject correctly 
responded "think" to all of the think items that were 
recognized as being old). On the other hand, a score of 0 
indicates that the subject failed to remember the source of 
any of the items that were remembered (e.g., the subject did 
not respond "think" to any of the think items that had been 
recognized). The mean proportions of correct source 
judgments are given in Table IV according to population, 
acquisition condition, and number of presentations.
The source proportion data of each acquisition 
condition were analyzed separately utilizing a 2 
(population) X 2 (item type) X 2 (repetition stimulus) mixed 
design ANOVA. The analysis of source proportion data in the 
listen-listen condition did not reveal any significant main 
effects or interactions. However, an analysis of the think- 
listen data revealed that the source memory of twice- 
presented items (M = .9) was significantly better than that 
of once-presented items (M = .84), F(1,35) = 4.61,
M Se = .022, p = .036. The item type X repetition 
interaction fell somewhat short of traditional levels of 
significance, F (1 , 3 5 ) = 2.996, MSe = .025, £  = .088. In 
this case, unlike listen items, there was a tendency for the 
source of think items to be more memorable following a 
second presentation. This trend is consistent with previous 
research (Johnson et al., 1980; Rabinowitz, 1989) which has
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Table IV
Mean Proportions of Correct Judgments of Origin
LD NLD
Once Twice Once Twice
Think-Listen
Think Items .73 ( .27) .85 ( .20) . 78 (.18) .86 ( .20)
Listen Items . 91 (.23) .90 ( .23) . 97 ( .08) .99 ( .03)
Listen-Listen
Annie Items . 72 ( .24) . 73 ( .26) . 72 ( .24) . 84 (.19)
Sarah Items . 68 ( .31 ) .71 ( .21 ) .78 ( .17) .81 (.18)
Note: Standard deviations are in parentheses.
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shown that repetition improves source memory for think, but 
not listen items.
The effect of item type was also significant, F(1,35) = 
1 0.1 62, M Se = .067, jd = .003. In this case, m e m o r y  for 
source information was better for listen items (M = .945) 
than for think items (M = .805). This result may reflect 
the same tendency found with false positives in which 
subjects attribute items of weaker familiarity to external 
sources. If subjects were responding to the stimuli of the 
present study in this way, source proportion scores for 
listen items would be inflated as a result of the subjects' 
inclination to reply "listen" whenever items were weak in 
familiarity. This bias to respond "listen" may also have 
contributed to a ceiling effect for listen items. This 
ceiling effect was especially pronounced in the NLD group 
(M = .97 and .99 for once and twice presented items, 
respectively).
False Positives
False positives are new items to which subjects 
mistakenly respond "old." Previous research (e.g., Foley et 
al., 1 983; Hastroudi et al., 1 989; Johnson et al., 1 980) has 
identified a pattern in which subjects attribute false 
positives to external sources. The underlying metamemory 
assumption that influences subjects to respond in this way
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was originally described by Johnson and Raye (1981) as "'it- 
h a d - t o - b e - y o u ' ('I'd r e m e m b e r  if it were me')" (p. 80).
Employing methods utilized by previous investigators, 
source attributions for false positives were categorized by 
item type. For each subject, source attributions for false 
positives were counted in a simple tally. The resulting 
means for each item type are presented in Table V.
The data for each acquisition condition were analyzed 
separately using a 2 (population) X 2 (item type) mixed 
design ANOVA. In the think-listen condition, a main effect 
of item type emerged, F(1 ,35) = 5.952, MSe = .727, £  < .018. 
Subjects in the think-listen condition were more likely to 
attribute false positives to listen items (M = 1.21) than to 
think items (M = .63). This tendency is evidence of the 
operation of the "it-had-to-be-you" bias (Johnson et al.,
1981 ) .
In the listen-listen condition, false positive 
attribution data for Annie and Sarah items were also 
submitted to a 2 (population) X 2 (item type) mixed design 
ANOVA. This analysis did not reveal any significant main 
effects or interactions. Subjects did not show a bias to 
attribute new items to either Annie (M = .99) or Sarah 
(M = .74).
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Table V
Mean False Positive Performance of LD and NLD Children 
According to Item Type
Condition LD NLD
Think-Listen
Think Items . 63 (1.06) . 22 ( .42)
Listen Items 1 .21 (1.90) .61 ( .91 )
Listen-Listen
Annie Items 1 . 05 (1.43) . 94 (1.58)
Sarah Items 1.10 (1.28) • u> 00 ( .77)
Note: Standard deviations are in parentheses.
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CHAPTER FIVE 
Discussion
The purpose of the present study was to investigate 
whether a deficit exists in the source monitoring abilities 
of LD children in two areas of discrimination:
(1) discrimination between memories of self-generated, 
covertly expressed ideas and memories of external 
perceptions, and (2) discrimination between memories of two 
external perceptions. Demonstration of these specific 
deficits, together with results of previous research, would 
provide strong evidence for the hypothesis that LD children 
possess a generalized deficit in remembering the source of 
memories containing verbal information. This hypothesis was 
confirmed by the results of the present study in that LD 
children experienced significantly greater difficulty than 
NLD children with tasks that measured external source 
monitoring (listen-listen condition) and an alternate form 
of reality monitoring (think-listen condition). The source 
monitoring deficit was not altered by the repetition 
stimulus manipulation.
There are a number of possible explanations for the 
apparent deficit in source memory ability in LD children.
One such explanation is that LD children may experience 
greater difficulty than NLD children in their attempt to 
evaluate the critical dimensions along which different
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classes of memories vary. For instance, the essential task 
in reality monitoring decisions (think-listen condition) is 
to evaluate the memory trace for the presence or absence of 
the cognitive operations that are characteristic of self­
generated information. Raye, Johnson, and Taylor (1980) 
believe that memory for cognitive operations may be the most 
prominent indicator of self-generated memories. On the 
other hand, discrimination between external memories 
(listen-listen condition) is accomplished through the 
evaluation of spatial, temporal, semantic, and sensory 
information (Johnson & Raye, 1980). The results of the 
present study suggest that LD children may fail to store 
and/or access information associated with cognitive 
operations, as well as information about the contextual 
details of a prior verbal experience.
These results also seem to indicate that the source 
monitoring difficulties of LD children are not due to 
different response biases. Subjects in the reality 
monitoring condition (think-listen condition) attributed 
false positives to an external source, rather than to items 
they had generated previously. This pattern, described by 
Johnson and Raye (1981) as "it-had-to-be-you (I 1d-remember- 
if-it-were-me)," was clearly observed in each population. 
Similar results Were found by Lorsbach et al. (1991 ) and 
suggest that the inferior source monitoring of LD children
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cannot be attributed to atypical beliefs about how memory 
works.
In summary, the results of the present study are 
consistent with previous research that has found the source 
monitoring abilities of LD subjects to be inferior to those 
of NLD subjects. The current findings are also consistent 
with the observation that the response biases of LD children 
are similar to those of their NLD counterparts.
Although the source monitoring results of the present 
study are consistent with the research of Lorsbach et al. 
(1991) that was discussed previously, the findings of the 
recognition data are not. In the present study, LD subjects 
demonstrated recognition memory equal to that of NLD 
subjects. However, differences in the recognition 
performance of LD and NLD children were noted by Lorsbach et 
al. (1991) in a source monitoring and a reality monitoring 
task. The findings of the previous study are of special 
interest to the present investigation because both studies 
utilized identical stimulus sentences. The discrepant 
outcomes may be explained by one critical difference between 
the studies; i.e., the type of sensory information provided 
by their respective experimental tasks. In Lorsbach et a l . 
(1991), stimuli were presented on audiotape; the present 
study utilized videotape, thereby adding a strong visual 
dimension to the sensory effects available to subjects. It
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is theorized that the visual dimension increased the 
attention of LD subjects and that, consequently, target 
items became more memorable to them. Therefore, the 
recognition differences found between groups by Lorsbach et 
a l . (1991) may be explained in terms of reduced levels of
attention in the LD group.
Such an explanation is consistent with one offered by 
Lorsbach et al. (1991). Those investigators interpreted 
observed recognition differences between groups within the 
framework of Mandler1s (1980) theory of recognition memory. 
Mandler proposes that recognition decisions are based on 
dual processes that operate conjointly. One process 
evaluates the arrangement of sensory or perceptual cues 
within individual memories; a different process evaluates 
memories for elaborative/conceptual information and 
relationships to other memories. Lorsbach et al. (1991) 
contended that successful recognition performance in their 
experimental task "to a large extent depended upon the 
encoding and retrieval of the elaborative contextual 
information that accompanied terminal nouns in each sentence 
frame" (p. 145). The investigators of that study theorized
that LD children may not have encoded terminal nouns within 
the context of their sentence frames, resulting in less 
distinctive encoding and depressed recognition. Further, LD
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children may have based their recognition decisions on 
perceptual and sensory information.
In the present study, it is possible that strong visual 
cues in the experimental task may have increased the 
attention of LD subjects to a level that made them available 
to the encoding of terminal nouns within sentence contexts. 
It is also possible that LD subjects took advantage of the 
strong visual dimensions of the experimental task and 
utilized the increased perceptual information to make 
successful recognition decisions. Therefore, discrepancies 
between the findings of Lorsbach et al. (1991) and the 
present study can be explained within the recognition memory 
theory of Mandler (1980).
Theoretical Implications
The reality monitoring model of Johnson and Raye (1981) 
provides a viable framework for interpeting the findings of 
research that examines the processes associated with reality 
monitoring. One observation of this model is that source 
discriminations for memories within the same class are more 
difficult than discriminations for memories of different 
classes (Johnson & Raye, 1981). The greater difficulty of 
within-class discriminations may be that source decisions 
are made by comparing the specific attributes of individual 
memories. For instance, for externally-derived memories, 
particular sensory attributes of the memories are compared
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(e.g., sound of the speakers' voices, their position in a 
room); for internally-generated memories, however, the 
comparison is based on particular dimensions of the 
cognitive operations information present. In contrast, 
between-class distinctions may be made by "tak[ing] 
advantage of the several dimensions on which the classes of 
internally and externally-derived memories differ" (Foley et 
al., 1 983, p. 56). The advantage of between-class 
discriminations has been demonstrated in previous literature 
across a range of subjects and materials (e.g., Foley et 
al., 1983; Hashtroudi et al., 1989; Raye and Johnson, 1981). 
Results of the present study are highly consistent with 
those findings in that source decisions were more accurate 
in the think-listen condition (between-class discrimination) 
than in the listen-listen condition (within-class 
discrimination). Therefore, the present investigation 
confirms an important observation of the reality monitoring 
model.
A second observation of Johnson and Raye's reality 
monitoring model is that reality monitoring decisions are 
based on the characteristic differences that exist between 
the two classes of memories. In consideration of this 
observation, the reality monitoring model would predict 
repetition of an item to strengthen the attributes of a 
memory that identify it as a member of a particular class.
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Results of the present study are highly consistent with this 
prediction in that source decisions improved with a second 
presentation of the stimulus item. This effect was evident 
across populations and conditions and was also found in the 
recognition data. Previous studies conducted with adult 
subjects that utilized repetition manipulations (Johnson et 
al., 1980; Rabinowitz, 1989) have found that repetition of 
stimulus items increases both source identification and 
recognition. The present study extends these results to 
children, including children with learning disabilities.
The effect of repetitions on the different items within 
each acquisition condition was examined separately in the 
present study. It was found that recognition memory 
significantly improved with repetition for both self­
generated (think items) and experimenter-presented targets 
(listen items). This result was also obtained in an 
examination of a think-listen condition with adult subjects 
that Johnson et al. (1980) submitted to a repetition 
manipulation and in a study by Rabinowitz (1989) that 
applied a repetition manipulation to a read-generate 
condition, comparing performances of older and younger 
adults. These studies have also observed that, for source 
identification, repetitions affect only memories of 
generated items and have no effect on memories of 
externally-derived events. Johnson et al. (1980), for
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example, found that "repetitions had little effect, if any, 
on the subjects' tendency mistakenly to say they had 
generated external items, but it reduced their tendency to 
attribute their thoughts to external sources" (p. 403). 
Similarly, Rabinowitz (1989) found that "the repetition 
manipulation only affected the judgments of origin for 
generated items" (p. 264). In the present study, this
pattern was evidenced by a trend for twice-presented "think" 
items to be more memorable than twice-presented "listen" 
items.
One of the more significant observations of the reality 
monitoring model is that recognition and source attribution 
are separate processes in memory. In the terminology of 
Johnson and Raye (1 980), "the dissociation of memory for 
occurrence and identification of origin indicates they are 
not based on exactly the same information or mechanism"
(p. 407). The idea of dissociation further emphasizes the
underlying differences of the two processes, with 
recognition being based more on familiarity and source 
identification being based more on conscious retrieval of 
contextual information. As explained by Johnson and Raye 
(1981),
Memory for occurrence and memory for origin sometimes
do respond to the same variables . . . .  In some cases,
memory for occurrence and identification of origin
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appear actually to be affected in opposite ways by the 
same variable . . . .  In summary, it does not appear to 
us that the information or processes that are important 
in discriminating the origin of information can be 
equated with those that produce voluntary recall or a 
feeling of familiarity." (p. 81 )
The presumed independence of the memory processes of source 
monitoring and recognition has been confirmed in previous 
research that has examined this phenomenon across a variety 
of materials and range of subjects (e.g., Foley & Johnson, 
1985; Lindsay & Johnson, 1991; Raye & Johnson, 1985).
In the present study, evidence for this observation 
comes from two observed dissociations. First, recognition 
and source identification were dissociated due to the 
effects of population. It was observed that LD subjects 
remembered items from each of the acquisition conditions as 
well as their NLD counterparts, but were much worse at 
identifying the source of these words. Second, recognition 
and source identification were dissociated by acquisition 
condition. While subjects recognized items from either 
condition equally well, they were much better at determining 
the source of items in the think-listen condition than in 
the listen-listen condition. The dissociation observed in 
these findings strongly supports the proposition that the 
two processes rely on different aspects of memory.
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Conclusions
The present study has demonstrated deficits in the 
source monitoring abilities of LD children in both reality 
monitoring and external source monitoring. In both forms of 
memory monitoring, LD subjects were found to be much worse 
than NLD subjects at deciding the origin of their memories. 
This conclusion confirms the hypothesis of Lorsbach et al. 
(1991) that, at least with verbal information, LD children 
possess a generalized deficit in discriminating the source 
of their memories.
An important question for future research would be 
whether the source monitoring deficits demonstrated by LD 
students with verbal materials can also be observed' with 
nonverbal materials (e.g., pictures, actions). Initial 
research with action materials has already been conducted 
with children without learning impairments (see Foley & 
Johnson, 1985). The findings of those experiments differed 
from previous results obtained with verbal tasks for the 
same population. Future research should focus on 
experiments utilizing a range of materials, especially those 
nonverbal in nature. The results of such investigations 
will be crucial to a deeper understanding of the many 
complex dimensions of memory as observed in normal children 
and learning disabled children alike.
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